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Commentary
Refining the "Presumptive Illegality"
Approach to Settlements of Patent
Disputes Involving Reverse Payments:
A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis &
Lemley
Thomas F. Cottert
I would like to thank the Minnesota Law Review for
inviting me to comment on the article by Herbert Hovenkamp,
Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley, entitled Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes.' As these
comments will show, I agree with most of the authors' analysis.
That analysis elaborates upon previous work by Professor
Hovenkamp 2 that I have cited with approval in the past.3
Moreover, the authors' proposed framework for evaluating
settlements involving what they refer to as "exclusion
payments" 4 from the plaintiff to the defendant is, as they
acknowledge, "roughly comparable" to a framework I recently
proposed. 5 Part I of this Commentary explains why the
authors' general framework for evaluating settlements of
intellectual property disputes is sound. Part II focuses more
directly on settlements involving reverse payments, including a
more detailed proposal than I have previously attempted
t Professor and Director of the Intellectual Property Program,
University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I would like to thank
Roger Blair, Jeff Harrison, and Bill Page for their comments and criticism and
Jeff Boyles for his research assistance. Any errors that remain are mine.
1. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003).
2. See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 2046 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent
Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 517-20 (2002) (citing 12
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 2046).
4. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1720.
5. See id. 1759 n.177.
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regarding the nature of the antitrust defendants' burden in an
action involving these payments. 6 Part II also suggests some
modifications to the authors' recommended solution to this
particular problem. This Commentary concludes that while the
approach to evaluating settlement agreements advocated by
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley is generally appropriate, courts
should consider ways of further simplifying the analysis in the
middle class of cases in which the legality of settlements
between parties may depend upon the resolution of patent
issues, especially when these settlements involve reverse
payments.
I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The general framework proposed by Hovenkamp, Janis,
and Lemley builds upon Hovenkamp's previous work on the
anticompetitive potential of settlements of intellectual property
disputes. As the authors note, the settlement of intellectual
property disputes implicates several policies that pull in
different directions. On one hand, settlement is usually,
though not universally, viewed as a social good because it
reduces the private and social costs of litigation.7  Patent
litigation in particular is traditionally very expensive, and thus
these costs can be quite high.8  Moreover, at least some
agreements that otherwise would be suspect or even clearly
illegal under general principles of antitrust law, such as
territorial market divisions, may be lawful as a matter of
intellectual property (IP) law.9 This disparity arises from the
6. I use the term "reverse payments," rather than "exclusion payments,"
because the payments go in the reverse direction from what one would assume
is common, i.e., from plaintiff to defendant instead of from defendant to
plaintiff.
7. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1723; see also Blair & Cotter,
supra note 3, at 513 n.99 (citing literature on the advantages and
disadvantages of settlement); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of
Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54
FLA. L. REV. 747, 752 (2002).
8. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1723; see also Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual
Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323, 1363 n.187 (2000) (citing sources that
discuss the costs associated with patent litigation); Crane, supra note 7, at
757.
9. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1720; see also 12 HOVENKAMP,
supra note 2, § 2040(b), at 201 n.10; 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw § 33.3(a) (2002); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3,
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fact that although both antitrust and IP law may be viewed as
tools for enhancing consumer welfare, they do so in different
ways: antitrust law by encouraging competition and
discouraging monopoly, and IP law by discouraging certain
forms of competition and facilitating some forms of monopoly.' 0
On the other hand, virtually any agreement between an IP
rights (IPRs) owner and an alleged infringer has the potential
for abuse, because (1) some, though not all, IPRs confer market
power;" (2) some, though not all, asserted IPRs are not
properly enforceable, either as a general matter or against the
alleged infringer in particular; 12 and (3) some, though not all,
agreements between a rights owner and an alleged defendant
may facilitate the division of markets or other anticompetitive
behavior beyond that which is contemplated by IP laws. 13
Finally, as the authors note, in some instances the parties to an
IPRs dispute settlement might have chosen a less restrictive
alternative than the one they actually chose, such as a
nonexclusive cross-license rather than a market division. 14 The
impact of these competing policies has been for courts to treat
settlements of IP disputes with some deference, 15 although this
deference hardly equates to per se legality; indeed, some of the
leading decisions involving unlawful restraints have involved
agreements to settle IP disputes.' 6 Making sense of the various
strands in the case law is thus no easy task.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley propose that courts can
attempt to negotiate this difficult terrain by dividing the
IP/antitrust cases involving dispute settlements into three
classes. The first class consists of cases in which the agreement
at issue would be lawful as a matter of antitrust law,
regardless of whether the agreement involved IPRs. One
example is an agreement to settle a dispute involving blocking
at 513-14.
10. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 513.
11. See Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential
Facilities Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 228 (1999).
12. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-07 (1998) (finding that
nearly fifty percent of all litigated patents are invalidated).
13. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 514.
14. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1723-24.
15. See id. at 1724; see also Crane, supra note 7, at 776-79 (stating that
courts tend to focus on the parties' intent and ignore the effect of settlements).
16. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 2046, at 262; Hovenkamp et al.,
supra note 1, at 1721.
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patents 7 under which the plaintiff and defendant each agree to
grant the other an unrestricted, nonexclusive license to use the
other's patent." Absent other, more suspicious terms, this
arrangement neither reduces output nor increases price, and
therefore does not call for serious antitrust scrutiny. 9
The second class of cases includes those in which the
agreement at issue would be unlawful as a matter of antitrust
law, regardless of the presence of valid and infringed IPRs. 20
Here the authors give an example 2' of a hypothetical
settlement over a patented windshield wiper blade between
Ford and General Motors (GM) that involves an agreement that
Ford will license the blade to GM on the condition that Ford
will sell pickups only west of the Mississippi, and GM only
east.22 In this instance, even if the patent is both valid and
infringed, the territorial market division should be per se
unlawful because it bears no plausible relationship to the scope
of the patent at issue.23
The third class of cases covers the gray area between the
above two situations, where antitrust law's disposition of the
cases varies. It encompasses agreements that would be
17. "Blocking patents" arise when someone patents an improvement over
another patented invention. For example, suppose that Patent 1 (the
"dominant" patent) claims an invention comprising limitations A, B, C, and D,
and that Patent 2 (usually called the "subservient" patent) claims an invention
comprising limitations A, B, C, D, and E. The owner of Patent 1 can prevent
others from making, using, or selling any product that contains all of the
limitations found in Patent 1; one such product would be the invention
claimed in Patent 2, which contains all of those limitations (plus one
additional limitation, E). The owner of Patent 1, however, also cannot make,
use, or sell the invention claimed in Patent 2, without obtaining permission
from the owner of Patent'2. Unless the parties reach agreement with one
another, no one will be allowed to make, use, or sell the invention claimed in
Patent 2 until Patent 1 expires. See Thomas F. Cotter, Conflicting Interests in
Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. REV. 591, 591-92 (1996). For further discussion of
blocking patents, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1997); Robert Merges,
Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994).
18. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1725.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1726.
21. The authors have previously used variations of this example. See, e.g.,
12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 2040(b), at 201-02; 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 9, § 33.6(b), at 33-30 to 33-31.
22. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1726.
23. See id.; see also id. at 1730, 1748, 1764-65 (providing other examples
of per se unlawful settlements).
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unlawful if they did not involve IPRs, but that might be
redeemed by the presence of these rights, depending on the
facts.24 The first example the authors give of such a "hard case"
is an agreement to settle a blocking patents dispute, under
which the parties agree to cross-license one another, but on
terms that are more restrictive than under the first, clearly
lawful example-e.g., by granting each other exclusive or
otherwise more restrictive licenses.25 This kind of agreement
promotes competition if both patents are valid and infringed,
because in the absence of an agreement patent law would give
each party the right to exclude the other from using the
subservient patent at all.26 Supposing instead that at least one
of the patents is invalid or that the subservient patent does not
infringe the dominant patent,27 an agreement that the parties
will grant each other exclusive licenses reduces competition,
assuming the court would have resolved the validity and
infringement issues correctly. Litigation would result in one or
the other (or both) patents being relegated to the public
domain, free for others to use at will,28 or at the very least, the
holder of the subservient patent would be free to use its
invention without permission of the dominant patent owner.
Thus, in a case in which a dominant and a subservient patent
owner agree to settle their dispute by granting one another
exclusive licenses, neither a rule of per se legality nor a rule of
per se illegality seems appropriate. A per se illegality rule
would be unwise, even though the parties could have chosen a
less restrictive alternative than the one they actually chose,
because requiring the antitrust tribunal to routinely scrutinize
settlement agreements for less restrictive alternatives would be
burdensome. In addition, the alternative the parties chose,
while less encouraging of competition than other possible
choices, is nevertheless within the permissible scope of
behavior under patent law, provided that both patents are valid
and the dominant patent is infringed.29 A rule of per se legality
24. See id. at 1726-27.
25. See id.
26. See supra note 17 (defining subservient).
27. See supra note 17 (defining dominant).
28. This assumes that collateral estoppel would apply, which in fact it
normally would. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 317-28, 338-45 (1971).
29. Indeed, requiring the parties to choose a less restrictive alternative
might reduce the returns on research and development and, at the margin,
deter some inventive activity. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
2003] 1793
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would be unwise as well, because in a case in which both are
aware that one or both patents is likely invalid due to the
existence of, for example, some prior art, or that the
subservient patent does not infringe, this rule would give carte
blanche to the dominant and subservient patent owners to
agree to a naked market division.
This analysis suggests that an antitrust tribunal
considering the legality of a settlement falling into the middle
ground must conduct some inquiry into the merits of the
underlying IP dispute. To this end, Professor Hovenkamp in
previous work and Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley in their
present article propose a three-part test. The court should first
determine whether the agreement at issue would violate the
antitrust laws if it were not an attempt to settle a dispute
involving IPRs. 30 If it would not, the case falls within the first
class of cases discussed above and the agreement is per se
lawful. If the agreement would otherwise violate antitrust
laws, the court must next inquire into whether the parties "did
have a bona fide dispute" and whether "the settlement is a
reasonable accommodation, and ... not more anticompetitive
than a likely outcome of the litigation."31 Finally, a court facing
uncertainty "must also consider whether the parties might
have settled on alternative, less restrictive terms."32 Thus,
while cases falling into the first two categories discussed above
can be decided on antitrust grounds alone, with no inquiry into
the merits of the underlying IP dispute, cases falling into this
third category "must be decided on the basis of IP policy rather
than antitrust policy."33  Referring to the inquiry to be
conducted under the three-part test as an application of the
rule of reason is, as the authors point out, a misnomer. The
ultimate question to be answered under a rule of reason
analysis is whether a particular restraint increases or reduces
output. In the present context, that question "really reduces to
nothing more than the validity of the underlying patent" (or
other IP right).34
As suggested above, I find nothing faulty in this overall
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 13, on file
with author).
30. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1728.
31. See id. at 1727.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1728.
34. Id. at 1731.
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framework, and indeed I have cited with approval Professor
Hovenkamp's earlier version of it. 35 Where more work remains
to be done is in refining the application of the three-part test to
the middle class of cases involving settlement agreements; as is
so often the case, the devil is in the details. As the authors
recognize, the dilemma presented by the three-part test is that
requiring antitrust tribunals to scrutinize the merits of a
settled IP dispute threatens to unravel the substantial private
and social benefits to which the settlement gives rise, including
the reduction in litigation costs that settlement generally
promotes.36 The authors note that one way to avoid this
problem in some cases is to focus on other elements of the
antitrust claim. For example, if the parties to the settlement
agreement lack market power, or the agreement does not
foreclose competition within a properly delineated market, a
court may dismiss the antitrust claim on antitrust grounds
alone, without any further inquiry into the validity of the IPRs
and their infringement. 37 Thus, even within the third class of
cases, not every settlement will necessarily result in an inquiry
into the underlying merits. Only when the antitrust tribunal
cannot resolve the antitrust claim on antitrust grounds alone
must it apply the three-part test, considering whether there
was "a legitimate dispute about the existence of an IP right and
likely infringement of a valid IP right," and whether the
agreement falls "within the range of permissible outcomes of
litigation.., no more anticompetitive than such an outcome
would have been."38
Even under this analysis, several important issues remain,
including the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to
validity and infringement (or invalidity and noninfringement).
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley favor allocating the burden to
the settling parties/antitrust defendants, because those parties
generally will be in a better position to prove that valid IPRs
were infringed than will be the antitrust plaintiff to prove that
such rights were not infringed. 39 I agree with this conclusion
as a general matter, and I have made the same observation
with respect to one type of settlement in particular, namely the
settlement of patent litigation involving "reverse payments"
35. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 517-18.
36. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1732.
37. See id. at 1732-33.
38. Id. at 1734.
39. See id. at 1733-34.
2003] 1795
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:1789
from the patent plaintiff to the patent defendant. 40 In previous
40. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 534-35. Commissioner Leary has
also argued against allocating the burden of proving invalidity and
noninfringement to antitrust plaintiffs such as the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), on the ground that it lacks the institutional capability to make such
determinations. See Thomas B. Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of
Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part 11, 34 J. HEALTH L. 657, 661-62 (2001).
In theory, one could increase the FTC's budget so that it could acquire the
necessary expertise, if there were obvious benefits to be gained from placing
the burden on the antitrust plaintiff. It is not clear to me what these benefits
would be, however, given that the parties to the settlement almost always
would be in a better position to prove validity and infringement than would an
outsider, even a very knowledgeable one. Moreover, in the short run, before
the FTC could acquire the needed expertise, allocating the burden to the
antitrust plaintiff might, at the margin, make some settlements effectively
unreviewable and hence per se lawful. For the reasons discussed above, I
agree with Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley that per se legality is uncalled for
in cases of this nature.
One argument against requiring the patent plaintiff/antitrust defendant
to prove patent validity is that doing so would contradict the statutory
presumption of patent validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be
presumed valid."); In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 103-05
(Fed. Trade Comm'n June 27, 2002) (initial decision), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/scheringinitialdecisionp2.pdf; Kevin D.
McDonald, Patent Settlements and Payments that Flow the "Wrong" Way: The
Early History of a Bad Idea, 15 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON. 2, 12-13
(2002). There is, to be sure, some tension between the language of § 282 and
the procedure proposed above. A court could resolve this tension, however, by
concluding that the statutory presumption was intended to apply in patent
infringement actions only, and not in other settings; to hold otherwise might
undermine the equally important federal policies embedded in the antitrust
laws. In addition, or alternatively, a court could incorporate the statutory
presumption into the analysis by requiring the patent plaintiff/antitrust
defendant to prove that it would have prevailed in the patent infringement
action in light of, inter alia, the statutory presumption. See Blair & Cotter,
supra note 3, at 533. At first blush, this solution seems problematic, because
it might appear that the patent owner could rely upon the presumption alone
to meet its burden of proof. In the analogous setting of a motion for a
preliminary injunction, however, a patent owner cannot rely upon the
presumption alone to establish a likelihood of success on the merits with
respect to validity, if the defendant "raises a substantial question concerning
validity." Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
see also New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882-83
(Fed. Cir. 1992). Precisely such a challenge frequently will have been raised
in Hatch-Waxman cases, which I discuss infra in Part II, because a firm filing
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) must provide a detailed
opinion supporting its claim of invalidity or noninfringement. See Hovenkamp
et al., supra note 1, at 1753 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)-(ii); 21 C.F.R. §§
314.50(i), 314.94(a)(12) (2002)). Thus, in the antitrust context a court could
require the defendants to prove that the patent owner probably would have
prevailed in the patent action, in light of the contrary evidence cited by the
ANDA filer and, if desired, in light of the statutory presumption of validity.
Note that if both parties to the patent action are defendants in the antitrust
1796
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work I argued in favor of the "quick-look" approach to this type
of agreement, meaning that the antitrust plaintiff would satisfy
its burden of production by showing that the settlement
involved reverse payments, at which point the burden would
then shift to the settling parties/antitrust defendants to
demonstrate that the settlement was lawful.4'
Further questions remain, and it is in this regard that one
can fruitfully elaborate upon the Hovenkamp-Janis-Lemley
framework. In particular, courts still need to work out the
details of how the antitrust defendants can meet their burden
of proving validity and infringement. Must they prove these
facts in the same manner and to the same extent as they would
have had to prove them in the patent suit, or can the inquiry be
truncated in some respects? Part II provides some tentative
thoughts on this issue within the context of the reverse
payments phenomenon.
II. REVERSE PAYMENTS
As Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note, one type of
settlement that recently has become controversial is the
settlement-sometimes final, sometimes interim-of a patent
infringement action in which the patent plaintiff agrees to pay
the defendant in return for the latter's agreement not to make,
use, or sell an allegedly infringing product.42 What makes
these settlements unusual is that the settlement payment goes
from plaintiff to defendant rather than, as one would assume is
more common, from defendant to plaintiff. There are now a
action, which I assume would normally be the case, any rule requiring them to
prove validity and infringement creates a peculiar dynamic. The patent
defendant cannot concede that validity and infringement were absolutely
certain, without contradicting the assertions it made in connection with its
Paragraph IV filing. This insight makes me all the more skeptical of the
authors' implicit suggestion that reverse payments should be lawful only in
instances in which the antitrust defendants can prove validity and
infringement to an extraordinarily high degree of certainty. See infra text
accompanying note 85.
41. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 534. I now recognize that it may
be preferable to avoid the term "quick-look," insofar as the ultimate inquiry
will be one of patent validity and infringement, rather than typical antitrust
issues. For this reason, in the title of this Commentary I use the term
"presumptive illegality" to convey the idea that proof of reverse payments or
other facts showing that the settlement falls into the middle category of cases
shifts the burden to the antitrust defendants to prove that the settlement
satisfies the three-part Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley test.
42. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1749.
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handful of documented instances in which the parties have
agreed to settlements incorporating reverse payments. 43 Most
of them have arisen in one rather peculiar setting, namely
patent litigation conducted in the shadow of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.44
As the authors explain, Hatch-Waxman was designed in
part to speed the entry of generic drugs to the marketplace. 45
The Act's rather byzantine statutory scheme has created some
unintended incentives to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
One problem arises in connection with the filing of Abbreviated
New Drug Applications (ANDAs) by companies that want to
market generic versions of approved drugs. Under Hatch-
Waxman, a company filing an ANDA must demonstrate only
that its product is bioequivalent to a drug that the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has already approved for
marketing; upon making this showing, the generic
43. A few have resulted in litigated decisions. In In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2001), and
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
the district courts found the settlement agreements at issue per se illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Terazosin, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1354;
Cardizem, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 705-06. The FTC later entered into consent
decrees with the drug companies involved in these cases. See In re Abbott
Labs., No. 981-0395 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 16, 2000) (agreement
containing consent order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbott
agreement.htm; In re Geneva Pharm., Inc., No. 981-0395 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Mar. 16, 2000) (agreement containing consent order), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/genevaagre.htm; In re Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., No. 9293 (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 8, 2001) (decision and order),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/hoechstdo.htm. In a third case, an
administrative law judge ruled in favor of the settling parties. See In re
Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 121-22 (Fed. Trade Comm'n June
27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/scheringinitialdecision
p2.pdf.; see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting the existence of a reverse payment
settlement). The recent FTC study on generic drug entry states that the
agency is aware of nine such settlement agreements, including the ones at
issue in Cardizem, Terazosin, and Schering-Plough. See FED. TRADE COMM'N,
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 25, 27-
28, 31-34 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrug
study.pdf [hereinafter FTC STUDY].
44. As I discuss below, there are some plausible scenarios, not dependent
upon the peculiarities of Hatch-Waxman, in which a patent plaintiff might
agree to a stipulated injunction in conjunction with a payment to the
defendant. See infra text accompanying notes 68-75. There are also a few
documented cases involving reverse payments and not arising in connection
with Hatch-Waxman. See Robert J. Hoerner, Antitrust Pitfalls in Patent
Litigation Settlement Agreements, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 113, 121-23 (1998).
45. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1751.
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manufacturer may rely upon the safety and effectiveness tests
that already have been conducted by the pioneer drug
manufacturer, and need not duplicate those tests.46 The ANDA
applicant also must certify that its generic drug will not
infringe any patent covering an approved drug listed in the
FDA's Orange Book.47 In particular, the applicant may certify,
inter alia, that the patent allegedly covering the approved drug
is either invalid or will not be infringed by the generic.48 Upon
receipt of notice of the filing of this particular certification
(known as a Paragraph IV certification), the pioneer
manufacturer has forty-five days to file suit against the ANDA
applicant for patent infringement. 49 If no suit is filed within
this time period, the FDA will approve the drug for marketing
immediately. 50 Significantly, any suit filed by the pioneer
within the forty-five day period would be premature under
normal patent law principles. Until the FDA approves the
generic drug for marketing, the generic manufacturer cannot
market its allegedly infringing product; thus, at the time the
pioneer patent owner files suit pursuant to Hatch-Waxman, the
generic manufacturer has not yet made, used, or sold any
product covered by the patent. The Patent Act nevertheless
defines the filing of an ANDA as an act of technical
infringement, thus permitting the pioneer suit to proceed.51 If
the pioneer does file suit within the forty-five day period, it
obtains an automatic stay of FDA approval of the ANDA, until
(1) the patent expires, (2) the patent litigation results in a final
judicial determination of invalidity or noninfringement, or (3)
thirty months have passed, whichever occurs first.52 Since
most patent suits take more than thirty months to resolve, the
pioneer manufacturer effectively obtains a thirty-month stay,
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at
504; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1753.
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 505;
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1753.
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at
505; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1753.
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 505;
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1753.
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at
1753.
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at
1753 n.146.
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 505-
06; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1753.
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unless the case settles or the patent expires first.5 3 Moreover,
in some instances, pioneer drug manufacturers have been able
to obtain multiple stays by listing additional patents in the
Orange Book.54 Recent proposed regulations, if valid and
implemented, would curtail that practice. 55
The reverse payment settlements that have attracted
attention in recent months all arose within the ANDA context.
In some instances, the pioneer and the generic manufacturer
agreed to an interim settlement under which the generic
manufacturer agreed not to market its product pending trial
and the pioneer agreed to pay the generic manufacturer a sum
of money in return.56 In others, the parties reached a final
settlement involving payments from the pioneer to the generic
firm. 57 In either form, these agreements raise several antitrust
concerns. It seems likely that in most cases the patent at issue
confers market power, meaning the ability to raise prices and
lower output, because otherwise the strategy of paying the
generic manufacturer not to compete makes no sense. 58
Additionally, it is likely that the pioneer stands to lose more
from the entry of generic competition than the generic entrant
stands to gain.5 9 At first blush, therefore, an agreement under
which the plaintiff promises to pay the defendant to delay entry
into the market might appear to be a blatant division of
monopoly rents. This may be justified if the pioneer's patent is
valid and infringed; but, significantly, the incentive to engage
in a division of profits is present even if the patent is neither
53. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 506; Hovenkamp et al., supra note
1, at 1753-54.
54. See FTC STUDY, supra note 43, at iii-v, 39-56; Hovenkamp et al.,
supra note 1, at 1754; Steve Seidenberg, Rule on Generics Faces Hurdles,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 2002, at C1.
55. See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent
Listing Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of
Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying that a Patent Claiming a Drug
Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,447, 65,449 (Oct. 24, 2002)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 314); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1756;
Seidenberg, supra note 54.
56. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F.
Supp. 2d 682, 696 (E.D. Mich. 2000); FTC STUDY, supra note 43, at 34-35.
57. See Terazosin, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1346; FTC STUDY, supra note 43, at
31-34.
58. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1757-58.
59. Roger Blair and I have discussed the reasons for this at length in a
previous article. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 524-25.
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valid nor infringed. Indeed, the incentive is enhanced because,
under another provision of Hatch-Waxman, the first ANDA
applicant is given a 180-day period of exclusive generic
marketing rights; that is, other generic manufacturers will not
be approved until 180 days after (1) the first ANDA applicant
begins marketing its drug, or (2) a court determines that the
pioneer patent is invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier. 60
Thus, unless and until the first ANDA applicant actually enters
the market, or the pioneer patent is judicially determined to be
invalid or not infringed, other generic manufacturers will be
precluded from entering and competing against the pioneer and
the first generic entrant. 61
The potential anticompetitive nature of settlement
agreements between the pioneer and the generic
manufacturers, particularly those involving reverse payments,
is therefore apparent. As Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note,
antitrust law may not be the only tool available to remedy this
potential for abuse.62 Revisions to the Hatch-Waxman Act and
the relevant federal regulations could go a long way toward
removing some of the statute's perverse incentives.63 Unless
and until such changes are made, however, the Federal Trade
Commission and the courts will have to grapple with the
legality of these settlements under antitrust law. To date, a
few courts and commentators have condemned settlements
involving reverse payments between the pioneer and the
generic drug manufacturers as per se unlawful. 64 Others,
60. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at
520; Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1754-55.
61. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1754-55.
62. See id. at 1756.
63. See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 708 PLI/PAT 89, 109-10 (2002) (discussing proposed revisions to 180-day
rule); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1756 (citing proposed legislation and
regulations); Julia Rosenthal, Note, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive
Settlements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 327-30 (2002) (discussing the McCain-Schumer and
Leahy bills); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
64. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp.
2d 682, 705-06 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Marcy L. Lobanoff, Comment, Anti-
Competitive Agreements Cloaked as "Settlements" Thwart the Purposes of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 50 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1353 (2001); W. Lindsey Wilson,
Comment, Antitrust Solutions to Pharmaceutical Abuses: An Examination of
Agreements Between Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L. 1227, 1236-37, 1251-
54. In their treatise, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley appear sympathetic to
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however, including Blair and myself, have argued that the per
se treatment of reverse payment settlements is inappropriate,
because these agreements also have some potential to enhance
rather than impede efficiency.65  Hovenkamp, Janis, and
Lemley fall into the latter camp as well, although they would
impose some strict requirements upon the patent
plaintiff/antitrust defendant who seeks to justify such an
agreement. 66 In the following paragraphs, I will explain briefly
why these agreements can either enhance or retard efficiency.
I will then discuss different ways in which the patent
plaintiff/antitrust defendant might attempt to satisfy its
burden of proving that a reverse payment settlement
agreement enhances efficiency. In this regard, I disagree with
one aspect of Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's proposal,
namely their suggestion that the amount of the payment must
be less than the patent plaintiffs avoided litigation expenses. 67
In my view, this particular restriction is unnecessarily narrow.
A hypothetical case may help to clarify how these reverse
settlement agreements can be either pro- or anticompetitive,
depending on the underlying facts. The model that follows
draws upon models presented in earlier work by Blair and
myself and by Daniel Crane. 68 Suppose that the defendant
began its alleged infringement at time to; that the parties are
this view, see 2 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 9, § 33.2, although this is not
the conclusion they reach in the Article under consideration. Note also that in
both Terazosin and Cardizem the agreements at issue involved several other
suspect provisions. See Terazosin, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-50; Cardizem, 105
F. Supp. 2d at 695-706. It is therefore possible that the courts would have
found the agreements per se unlawful even in the absence of reverse
payments, or that they would not condemn all settlements involving reverse
payments as per se unlawful.
65. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 96-101 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n June 27, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
scheringinitialdecisionp2.pdf; Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 532-38; Yee Wah
Chin & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Antitrust Update, 2 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 30, 37-38 (2001); Crane, supra note 7, at 779-96; Richard J.
Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 78-79
(2001); Leary, supra note 40, at 659-61; McDonald, supra note 40, at 12-13;
Shapiro, supra note 29 (manuscript at 35). Although none of the sources listed
in this footnote advocates a rule of per se illegality, some are much more
skeptical than others about the pro-competitive benefits of reverse payment
settlements.
66. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1759-60.
67. See id. at 1759.
68. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 524-25; Crane, supra note 7, at
773.
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considering settlement at time t,; and that trial is due to take
place at time t2. As of t1, the patent owner has incurred lost
profits of $30 million. The present value of its estimated future
lost profits if the infringement does not cease is $100 million,
consisting of an additional $10 million in lost profits from now
until t2 and $90 million thereafter. The present value of the
defendant's estimate of its own lost profits if it- ceases to market
its product at t1 is $50 million, consisting of $5 million in lost
profits from now until t2 (call this GA,,2) and $45 million
thereafter.69 As of tp, the plaintiffs expected benefit from going
to trial can be expressed as
(1) E[B]hT = P [I + 5,(D,,tl + Dnt2)] - C-,T,
where P, is the plaintiffs estimate of the probability of success
on the merits; I,, is the plaintiffs estimate of the present value
to it of obtaining an injunction at t2; D , is the plaintiffs
estimate of its damages at t,; D,.t2 is the plaintiffs estimate of
the additional damages it will incur from tl to t2; 6, is the
portion of its damages that the plaintiff expects to be able to
collect from the defendant, where 0 8 _ 1; and CT is the
plaintiffs estimate of the present value of its future litigation
costs. The defendant's expected loss if it goes to trial can be
expressed as
(2) E[L]AT = PA[IA+ 8A(DAtl + DA,,2)] + CA,r,
where PA is the defendant's estimate of the plaintiffs
probability of success on the merits; IA is the defendant's
estimate of the present value of its loss if an injunction issues
69. These values are roughly consistent with the analysis, presented by
Blair and myself, in which we assumed that the hypothetical patent owner's
profit would fall by $100 million annually following the introduction of a
generic drug, and that the generic manufacturer's annual profits would be
between 50% and 70% of the patent owner's profit. Blair & Cotter, supra note
3, at 524-25. For the reasoning behind these assumptions, see id. In the
context of Hatch-Waxman, once the generic manufacturer enters the market
other generic manufacturers may follow after 180 days, see supra text
accompanying note 59, which would further deplete the generic
manufacturer's profit margin. Following the introduction of the generic, the
pioneer patent owner may continue to market its brand-name drug, at a
higher price, to those price-insensitive consumers who prefer the brand name.
See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 497-99. The pioneer's profits will
decrease, because it is selling to a smaller group of consumers, albeit at a
higher price, but they will not fall to zero.
2003] 1803
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
at t2; 5A(DA, 1 + DAt2) is the defendant's estimate of the amount
of damages it will pay if it is found liable; and CAT is the
defendant's estimate of the present value of its future litigation
costs. For simplicity, assume symmetric information, i.e., P, =
PA and 8,D, = 8ADA; that the defendant will not be judgment-
proof, i.e., 8 = 1; and that P = .75, i.e., the plaintiff has a 75%
chance of prevailing at trial. On these facts, the plaintiffs
expected benefit from proceeding with litigation is .75(90 + 30 +
10) - C, = $97.5 million - CT; the defendant's expected loss is
.75(45 + 30 + 10) + CAT = $63.75 million + CAT. A settlement
under which the defendant immediately ceases its
infringement, and neither party pays any money to the other,
brings the plaintiff $100 million in immediate benefits (I, +
Dt,2) and brings the defendant $50 million in immediate losses
(IA + GA ). A rational defendant therefore would be willing to
settle the case by agreeing to cease infringement and pay the
plaintiff up to $13.75 million + CT °7 0 A rational plaintiff would
be willing to accept the promise to cease infringement and to
accept payment of at least -$2.5 million - CT. In other words,
the plaintiff would be willing to pay the defendant as much as
$2.5 million + CT to settle the case. To put it another way, the
range of possible payments stretches from a "reverse payment"
of $2.5 million, to a payment from defendant to plaintiff of
$13.75 million, aside from litigation costs. Thus, even when the
plaintiffs chances of prevailing at trial are quite good, it is
conceivable that the parties might agree to a settlement under
which the plaintiff would pay the defendant.
Generally, one would expect the parties to settle when the
expected benefit of settlement exceeds the expected benefit of
litigation. The monetary aspect of the settlement agreement
will satisfy the following condition:
(3) E[BlT - E[B]s _ SP E[L],T- E[L]As,
where E [B],s is the expected benefit to the plaintiff of settling;
E[L]AS is the expected loss to the defendant of settling; and SP
is the settlement payment. Substituting terms shows that
70. More realistically, one would not expect the defendant to continue
marketing during t, if its expected loss from doing so (here $7.5 million)
exceeded its expected gain (here $5 million), although strategic considerations
or other factors may weigh in the defendant's calculation.
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(4) P.[IR + 5,(Dt, + D,,)] - C,T - (I, + D1, 2) < SP
PA[IA + 5A(DAt] + DA,,2)] + CAT - (IA + GAt 2).
Now consider the parties' incentives under Hatch-
Waxman. Once the plaintiff files suit, it obtains an automatic
thirty-month stay, so the defendant may not market any
infringing product as of t1. Dt, therefore equals 0. D,2 and GA, 2
may be greater than or equal to zero, but they will tend toward
zero if (1) the plaintiff obtains multiple stays71 or (2) trial is
expected to occur within thirty months of to. Moreover, 5 may
be significantly less than 1, if the generic manufacturer has few
assets or sources of income other than the drug at issue.72 As 5,
Dt 2, and GA0 2 approach zero, equation (4) becomes
(5) P,(I,) - CST - L' SP < PA(IA) + CAr - IA.
Two observations follow from this equation. The first is
that the amount the plaintiff will agree to pay ranges from CT
when P, = 1 (i.e., the plaintiff is 100% certain of victory at
trial)73 to CT + I, when P, = 0 (i.e., the plaintiff is 100% certain
of losing at trial). At any probability in between, the plaintiff
will agree to pay the defendant up to C zT plus some portion of
I, as set forth in the table below. Significantly, the plaintiff
will always be willing to pay the defendant something to settle.74
Second, when the defendant is 100% certain that its product
would infringe (PA = 1), the defendant will be willing to pay CAT
to settle. When the defendant is sure that its product would
not infringe (PA = 0), the defendant would be willing to accept IA
- CAT. At some intermediate probability, the defendant would
be willing to accept some portion of IA, minus the litigation
expenses it will avoid by settling. Table 1 illustrates the range
of likely settlement values for different probabilities of success.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
72. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 524-25.
73. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note this point as well. See
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1758 (citing Shapiro, supra note 29
(manuscript at 35)).
74. See McDonald, supra note 40, at 9 (making this point); see also
Shapiro, supra note 29 (manuscript at 19-21).
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Table 1: Assume that P, = PA = P; I = 90 million; and IA = 45
million.
One can devise further variations on the model. If the
defendant is expected to market a product at some point
between ti and t2, payment will be determined as follows:
(6) P4[I + 8,Dt2]- CT - (I + Dt 2) < SP PAIA +
5 ADA,t 2 ] + CAT- (IA + GAt,).
Alternatively, if the parties agree to an interim settlement
only, the settlement substitutes for a preliminary injunction, in
which case the only costs avoided are the litigation expenses
that would have been incurred in the course of obtaining a
preliminary injunction (attorney's fees, any nonrefundable
expenses relating to the procurement of a bond, and so on) and
Dt2. Thus,
(7) P,(5Dt 2 ) - C7Z,p1 - D <t2  SP _ PA(8AGAt 2) + CA, -
GA,t 2
Even under these scenarios, and even with a high probability of
success on the merits, the plaintiff may agree to pay the
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defendant to settle.75 Finally, if risk aversion or asymmetric
information are added to the mix, reverse payments may occur
even when P, is very high.76
The fundamental point is that the plaintiff often will have
an incentive to pay the defendant not to enter the market,
regardless of whether the former expects to win at trial. This
conclusion suggests that reverse payments should not be per se
illegal, since they are just as consistent with a high probability
of validity and infringement as they are with a low probability.
It also suggests that reverse payments should not be per se
legal for the same reason. In particular, if the probability of
success is below 50%, the settlement should be condemned as
an unlawful restraint of trade under the analysis presented in
Part I. A settlement involving reverse payments falls within
the middle class of cases in which the antitrust tribunal must
consider whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the
merits and whether the settlement is consistent with a likely
outcome at trial. A crucial question is whether this inquiry can
be answered without having to go through a patent trial-
within-a-trial in the antitrust case.
The antitrust tribunal has at least three options. The first
is to have a patent trial-within-a-trial, complete with Markman
hearings and expert testimony about damages. At the margin,
if the probability that a reverse payment settlement would
provoke an antitrust suit is one and if the expected cost of
defending such a suit is the same as the expected cost of going
to trial in the patent case, rational parties would take this into
account in structuring the settlement, such that the expected
benefit of settlement would not include any savings in litigation
costs. In other words, equation (5) would reduce to
75. In equation (6), for example, if 5 = .75, P = .75, and the other values
are as hypothesized above, then equation (6) reduces to .75(90 + .75(10)) - C., -
(90 +10) SP .75(45 + .75(10)) + CAT - (45 + 5), that is, -$26.875 - CT SP
-10.625 + CAT. In equation (7), using the values in the text above and 8 = .75,
one would expect a payment of between $4.375 million and $2.1875 million,
abstracting from litigation costs.
76. See Gilbert & Tom, supra note 65, at 77; Shapiro, supra note 29
(manuscript at 25). Even with a very high probability of success, for example,
a risk averse plaintiff might be willing to pay something over C T to avoid a
possible erroneous result at trial. Asymmetric or less-than-perfect
information also could affect the parties' estimates of the probability of
success, the defendant's solvency, or the value of an injunction, and hence the
value of settlement.
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(8) P=(I ) - I, SP s PA(IA) - IA.
Under this scenario, if the patent plaintiff and defendant
agreed to a settlement under which the defendant promises not
to market its allegedly infringing product, plaintiffs might still
pay defendants, but the payment range would be narrower, as
shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Assume that P, = PA = P; I, = 90 million; and IA = 45
million.
P Amount plaintiff will pay
defendant
0 90m > SP > 45m
.25 67.5m > SP > 33.75
.50 45m > SP > 22.5m
.75 22.5m > SP > 11.25m
1 0
One would expect reverse payment settlements to become
much less common under this scenario, for two reasons. As
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note, an alternative to a
reverse payment settlement would be for the parties to settle
on terms that would permit the defendant to market its product
under a license from the plaintiff. Depending upon the
amounts involved, this alternative might become more
attractive to the parties than a settlement involving reverse
payments where the latter does not result in litigation cost
savings. Further, the parties must take into account their
potential liability should the antitrust tribunal find their
settlement to violate the Sherman Act. This risk is clearly
higher under the reverse payments scenario than under the
licensing scenario. If the parties settle in good faith but are
concerned that the antitrust tribunal will not decide the issues
of patent scope and validity correctly, they will be even more
averse to entering into this type of settlement. If the benefits of
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reverse payment settlements are reduced enough, and the costs
sufficiently increased, these settlements might disappear
altogether.
Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley might not view the
elimination of reverse payment settlements as a huge loss, and
perhaps they are right. It may be that the marginal social
benefit of tolerating such settlements is low, given their
potential abuse and given the existence of an alternative
settlement structure that would be less susceptible to abuse,
but the evidence is not so clear. The danger of channeling
Hatch-Waxman litigants toward settling on terms that allow
the defendant to license the plaintiffs patent and away from
settling on terms that involve reverse payments is that doing so
threatens to reduce the value of pharmaceutical patents,
including valid pharmaceutical patents. Logically, if it were in
the plaintiffs interest to license the defendant, the plaintiff
would do so voluntarily."7 The fact that plaintiffs sometimes
prefer reverse payments to licenses suggests that reverse
payments sometimes promise a higher payoff to the plaintiff
than would granting a license. The analysis above further
demonstrates that a preference for reverse payments is not
necessarily proof of an anticompetitive scheme.
Restricting the parties from settling on terms that involve
reverse payments would decrease the value of at least some
valid and infringed pharmaceutical patents, although this
reduction in value may not matter much.78 Perhaps the
77. As Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley note, if transactions costs are zero
the plaintiff would be indifferent between licensing (and extracting all the rent
from) the defendant, and manufacturing all of its product itself. See
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1750. When transaction costs are present
and the plaintiff prefers not to license, the most likely reason is that licensing
will reduce the plaintiffs expected income. Indeed, there are a number of
transaction costs and other related costs that often significantly decrease the
patentee's ability to extract rent from the licensee. See Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 818 (2002) (discussing the relevant literature); see
also McDonald, supra note 40, at 12.
78. Nobody knows whether patents serve their intended purposes of
inducing invention, disclosure, and innovation, although there is some
evidence that they might, in the pharmaceutical industry in particular. See
WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT
(OR NOT) tbl. 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552,
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf (suggesting that
firms often rank patents below other reasons for engaging in product
innovation, but that patents may be relatively more effective at inducing
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reduction in patent value attendant upon forcing some patent
owners into their second best settlement option would be small
and therefore worth the resulting increase in consumer
surplus. 79  Whether patents are good or bad in general,
however, is not the issue. For better or worse, patents exist,
and they reflect a legislative judgment that their benefits
exceed their costs. For antitrust law to undermine the value of
valid and infringed patents, which a rule discouraging reverse
payments would in some instances do, is troubling. In some
respects, such a rule is analogous to a compulsory licensing
scheme,80 and yet U.S. law has generally avoided the
compulsory licensing of patents, except when, inter alia,
compulsory licensing has been deemed necessary to remedy an
antitrust violation.81 Where the violation is hypothetical only,
however, a rule that encourages licensing over exclusion is
difficult to square with traditional patent and antitrust policy,
innovation in some industries, including pharmaceuticals, than in others).
This is not to say that the incentive provided by the patent system is optimal.
In light of the existence of other incentives to engage in research and
development, perhaps the current system is more socially costly than is
necessary. For a provocative, and skeptical, assessment of the pharmaceutical
industry's role in drug innovation, see Arnold S. Relman & Marcia Angell,
America's Other Drug Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 2002, at 27.
79. Ian Ayres has noted that eliminating the last increment of a
monopolist's profit increases consumer surplus by a disproportionately large
amount. See Ian Ayres, Pushing the Envelope: Antitrust Implications of the
Envelope Theorem, 17 Miss. C. L. REV. 21, 25 (1996); see also Thomas F.
Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 241-43 (1999) (discussing Ayres and related
commentary). One problem with applying Ayres's insight to IP matters,
however, is that we don't really know how much of a profit reduction will
result from a change in any given rule. See Cotter, supra, at 243. Another is
that licensing may be a decidedly second-best option under some
circumstances, see Blair & Cotter, supra note 77, at 818, and thus the
reduction in profit may be substantial, not small, in the present context.
80. It is not exactly a compulsory licensing scheme, to be sure. First, no
one is compelling anything. If the parties want to proceed to trial instead of
settling, they may do so; or they may settle for reverse payments and take
their chances that no antitrust liability will result. Still, a rule that
discourages reverse payments necessarily increases the incentive to settle by
licensing. Second, unlike a true compulsory licensing system, a rule that
discourages reverse payments does not contemplate the existence of some
government agency that will determine the license fee. If the parties cannot
agree on the amount, no license will issue. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs option
of not licensing at all is severely constrained, if licensing is the only realistic
option to proceeding to trial.
81. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPs-Legality of Measures Taken to
Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 74 n.15
(2001).
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whatever the merits of that policy may be.82 Moreover, taking
one settlement option away from the parties may discourage
some settlements altogether, and thus reduce the substantial
social benefits of private dispute resolution.
A second possibility would be for the antitrust tribunal to
conduct a minimal inquiry into patent scope and validity,
similar to the inquiry courts conduct to determine if a patent
suit is a sham and therefore immune from antitrust scrutiny.8 3
Yee Wah Chin and Thomas G. Krattenmaker have advocated
this approach,8 4 and Crane has noted that a "good faith"
approach would be consistent with some prior case law.8 5
Crane, however, rejects this standard,8 6 and I too have
previously argued against it, on the ground that it would
permit too many anticompetitive settlements to escape
scrutiny.87 A suit with only a 25% chance of success may not be
a sham, but a settlement based upon such a low probability
estimate reduces consumer welfare for no apparent offsetting
benefit. Such a low standard of scrutiny is therefore not
appropriate.
A third possibility would be for some form of truncated
inquiry, but not quite as truncated an inquiry as under the
option just discussed. One option would be for an abbreviated
hearing, analogous to a preliminary injunction hearing, at
which the patent plaintiff/antitrust defendant would have to
prove to the antitrust tribunal that it was likely to succeed on
82. I recognize that there is some tension between my statements
cautioning against using antitrust law to undermine patent law, and my
suggestion supra that courts should require the patent plaintiff/antitrust
defendant to prove validity, notwithstanding the presumption of validity that
arises under § 282 of the Patent Act. See supra note 40. Two points are
important, however. First, as noted above, even with the benefit of the
presumption, almost half of all litigated patents are invalidated. See Allison &
Lemley, supra note 12, at 205-07. For the antitrust tribunal to ignore the
presumption therefore may not affect substantive rights as much as one might
expect. Second, I argued supra that the allocation of the burden of proof of
validity to the antitrust defendants may be necessary to accommodate
antitrust policy. See supra note 40. It is not as clear to me, however, that
patent law must accommodate antitrust policy to the extent of (effectively)
requiring parties who wish to settle their dispute to agree to a licensing
arrangement.
83. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 535 n.174.
84. Chin & Krattenmaker, supra note 65, at 37-38.
85. See Crane, supra note 7, at 776-79.
86. See id.
87. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 535 n.174.
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the merits 'of its patent claim.88 Alternatively, and perhaps
more promisingly, one might envision a sliding scale under
which the strength of the evidence on validity and infringement
would vary depending on the presence or absence of various
factors. 89 For example, Crane suggests that when the patent
plaintiff/antitrust defendant has obtained a preliminary
injunction from the patent court prior to settlement, the patent
court's finding that there was a likelihood of success on the
merits should be entitled to substantial weight.90 Similarly,
when the amount of the reverse payment is roughly equal to
the plaintiffs saved litigation costs, the analysis above suggests
that the patent was likely to have been valid and infringed and
therefore only a minimal inquiry into validity and infringement
would be necessary. Indeed, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley
suggest that reverse payments should be lawful only when,
inter alia, the amount of the payment reflects the plaintiffs
litigation cost savings. 91  Making this a hard-and-fast
requirement, however, is unwarranted. Doing so would rule
out the availability of reverse payments except in cases in
which the patent plaintiff was absolutely certain of prevailing
at trial, but absolute certainty is probably rare and reverse
payments are to be expected even when the plaintiffs
probability of success is high but not certain. If, as I suggest
above, a rule that de facto forbids reverse payments is
undesirable, then surely reverse payments should be tolerated
when the patent plaintiff has, say, a 75% chance of succeeding
at trial.92
88. Crane recommends this procedure, at least for cases in which the
patent tribunal did not issue a preliminary injunction. See Crane, supra note
7, at 785. Crane also suggests the appointment of special masters to assist the
antitrust tribunal. See id. at 786.
89. See id. at 779-96 (presenting a similar framework); Gilbert & Tom,
supra note 65, at 78-79 (listing factors that make reverse payment settlements
more or less suspicious).
90. See Crane, supra note 7, at 783-85.
91. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1759.
92. One might, however, make a case for requiring evidence that the
probability of success was greater than just 50%. As noted above, the first
ANDA filer obtains a 180-day period of exclusivity vis-a-vis other ANDA filers,
measured from the date of the earlier of (1) the first ANDA filer's marketing of
a generic product or (2) a judgment of invalidity or noninfringement with
respect to the pioneer patent. See supra text accompanying note 59. This
provision of Hatch-Waxman ups the ante for the pioneer manufacturer,
because a favorable judgment or settlement vis-a-vis the first ANDA filer may
keep other ANDA filers at bay. This much is obvious, but there is a more
subtle point as well. A generic drug may be the bioequivalent of an approved,
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patented drug (and hence potentially FDA-approvable) without necessarily
infringing the approved drug patent. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 510
n.92. (If this were not so, Paragraph IV certifications asserting
noninfringement would be a waste of time.) A judgment (or valid stipulated
judgment) in favor of the pioneer patent owner effectively means that the first
bioequivalent generic drug at issue infringes, but-importantly-it does not
necessarily mean that a second bioequivalent drug also would infringe. For
example, the patent may cover a method of delivery or a formulation that is
identical to the method of delivery or formulation of the first generic, but not
the second. See McDonald, supra note 40, at 6. Nevertheless, a judgment (or
valid stipulated judgment) in favor of the pioneer patent owner and against
the first ANDA filer effectively stays any further ANDAs from issuing, even if
the second ANDA filer's product would not infringe. This makes little enough
sense when the pioneer patent is clearly valid and infringed by the first
generic drug, but the potential competitive harm is magnified when the
settlement involves a questionable patent. Of course, if the first ANDA filer
remains free to waive its 180-day exclusivity, this problem may be mitigated.
I suggest infra that agreements not to waive exclusivity ought to raise a red
flag. See infra text accompanying note 97.
Anticipating my response to their article, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley
note that there are two components of any rational exit payment: the cost of
continued litigation and the value of eliminating competition that the patentee
could not expect to exclude after trial. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at
1758. They then argue that reverse payment settlements should be lawful
only to the extent that they reflect the first component and not the second.
See id. at 1758-59. In my view, however, the fact that a reverse payment
partly reflects the second component does not necessarily mean that the
payment should be condemned. Every settlement of every case has a
component that reflects uncertainty over the outcome at trial, and in the
present context this uncertainty should induce a rational patent plaintiff to
pay an amount that is smaller in value than the value it would receive if it
prevailed at trial. Of course, the mere fact that a payment is rational does not
necessarily mean that it should be lawful. I therefore do not agree with the
authors' characterization of my argument as
it will often be rational for pharmaceutical patentees to agree to make
exclusion payments to generic competitors, and therefore that the
mere existence and size of those payments should not automatically
incline courts to find that they are illegal. We do not think it follows
that because it is rational for the patentee to agree to an exclusion
payment, that payment cannot be anticompetitive. Far from it.
See id. at 1758 (footnote omitted). I also do not think the stated conclusion
follows, and I do not believe the text above reflects such a sentiment; reverse
payments clearly can be anticompetitive, even if rational. A better statement
of my view, as reflected in the text above, is that I do not believe all such
payments in amounts exceeding avoided litigation costs should be condemned
on antitrust grounds. The fact that some, perhaps most, reverse payment
settlements are anticompetitive leads me to conclude that the burden should
be on the antitrust defendants to prove validity and infringement. I also
think, however, that some settlements in excess of avoided litigation costs are
both rational and should be lawful, and thus the proper analysis of reverse
payment settlements should involve additional factors. I also recognize,
however, that my proposed rule increases administrative costs, and that this
is a drawback.
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When the amount of the reverse payment is higher than
the saved litigation expenses but less than the defendant's
potential loss at trial, it is still likely that the patent was valid
and infringed, although one can devise cases in which higher
payments are consistent with a high probability of success, and
low payments are consistent with a low probability of success. 93
This insight led Blair to conclude that whenever the amount of
the reverse payment is less than what the defendant could
have earned from marketing a noninfringing product, the
reverse payment should not be suspect.94 In light of the
possibility of pathological cases, Blair's proposition may be too
extreme, but when the antitrust defendants can show that the
payment is below the expected amount of the patent
defendant's loss if an injunction were to issue, the burden of
proving validity and infringement should be somewhat easier
to satisfy than at a full-blown infringement trial.
When the amount of the reverse payment is higher yet, the
potential for anticompetitive harm is stronger.95 The above
analysis suggests that as the amount approaches the value of
an injunction to the patent plaintiff, the patent plaintiffs case
93. In the hypothetical summarized in Table 1 above, for example, if P =
.75, C,, = $5 million, and I -- $160 million, the reverse payment could be as
high as $45 million, which is equal to IA. Alternatively, suppose that P = .25,
IA = $4 million, and CA, = $.5 million. On these facts, the defendant would be
willing to accept as little as $2.5 million to settle.
94. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 3, at 533-34. As we note, it may not be
easy to estimate the defendant's loss if the court were to enter an injunction.
See id. at 533 n.171. In the peculiar context of Hatch-Waxman, however, it
actually may be easier to estimate the value of an injunction to both the
plaintiff and the defendant than in other types of cases. Because
pharmaceutical patents often embody discrete products, rather than
components of larger products, see Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1739,
and because they sometimes do confer market power, see id. at 1757-58,
estimation of both the plaintiffs and the defendant's projected lost profits may
be more feasible than in the typical case. In other, more typical, patent cases,
estimating the gains and losses attributable to infringement can be a
nightmare. See generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking
Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2001). In any event, the
suggestions above are simply ways of trying to short-circuit a full-blown
inquiry into validity and infringement. If the calculation of the patent
defendant's potential loss proves to be more onerous than demonstrating
validity and infringement, then the antitrust defendants presumably will opt
for the latter.
95. For example, in Abbott Laboratories, the amount of the monthly
payment ($4.5 million) was alleged to be at least three times the amount of
the defendant's projected losses ($1.5 million). See Compl. 25, 27, In re
Abbott Labs., No. C-3945 (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/O5/c3945complaint.htm.
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becomes weaker. To state an applicable "rule" with more
precision, however, may be impossible' As Crane notes, if one
could accurately calculate, ex post, the values of I., I., and D,
the amount of the reverse payment would provide sufficient
evidence of the parties' ex ante assessment of the plaintiffs
probable success. 96 Unfortunately, the antitrust tribunal may
find this task just as difficult as directly assessing the ex post
likelihood of validity and infringement. In cases in which the
amount of the payment substantially exceeds the parties'
avoided litigation costs, the sensible solution may be to give
them a choice of proving either that the payment is consistent
with a high probability of success on the merits, in light of the
parties' expected gains and losses, or that the patent is valid
and infringed. Presumably the parties will opt for the less
costly choice. Both options may deter some reverse payment
settlements that are negotiated in good faith and in the shadow
of a high probability of success on the merits, but any other
procedure may present too high a risk of anticompetitive abuse.
Further, the presence of other factors, such as an agreement on
the part of the patent defendant not to waive its 180-day
exclusivity period in favor of another generic manufacturer or
not to market non-infringing substitutes, should be sufficient to
trigger more intense scrutiny, or these aspects of the
agreement should be condemned on their own terms, even
when the amount of the payment is relatively low. These terms
otherwise may insulate the patent plaintiff from lawful
competition from either the settling defendant or other
potential ANDA filers. 97
CONCLUSION
As stated at the outset, I largely agree with Hovenkamp,
Janis, and Lemley's approach to evaluating the anticompetitive
potential of IP settlement agreements. With respect to reverse
payment settlements, I agree that the antitrust defendant
should have the burden of proving validity and infringement
with respect to the underlying patent claim, but the antitrust
tribunal may be able to short-circuit the inquiry in some cases.
96. See Crane, supra note 7, at 788-91.
97. See supra note 92; see also Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1764-65
& n.196 (noting other suspicious aspects of the Cardizem and Terazosin
settlements). Other commentators have made similar observations. See
Crane, supra note 7, at 794-96; Gilbert & Tom, supra note 65, at 78;
McDonald, supra note 40, at 6.
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Finally, I disagree with Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley's
condemnation of all reverse payment settlements in which the
amount of the settlement exceeds the plaintiffs avoided
litigation costs, even though I think that courts should remain
moderately skeptical of such agreements. As a result, my
recommended approach is more accommodating of these
settlements than the approach suggested by Hovenkamp,
Janis, and Lemley, but less accommodating than some other
proposed resolutions.
